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I. INTRODUCTION
The controversy generated as a result of Google's plan to digitize library
book collections and make them searchable over the Internet illustrates the
tension between United States copyright law and the growing capabilities
of technology.' Copyright law was originally created under Congress' con-
stitutional powers to promote the progress of arts and sciences.2 Although
Congress wanted to promote the dissemination of information into the pub-
lic domain, it feared that without offering creators a means to generate
exclusive profits, there would be no incentive to create new ideas or artistic
expressions.3 Google's quest to create an online card catalog highlights the
I J.D. Candidate, May 2008. I would like to give special thanks to my family and
friends for their support and encouragement throughout the writing process.
1 See generally, Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for
Copyright Reform, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 761 (2006) (discussing the Google Book Search pro-
ject in the context of how the current status of copyright law impedes the creation of digital
libraries); see also Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright on Its Head? The Googlization of
Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEx. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (draft at
3-4, available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/ip/BrachaPaper.pdf).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution vests in Congress the power "to Pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
3 See Mazer v. Stein, 343 U.S. 201, 219 (1952) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'); see also Susan
Kim, Selling Spray Paint in Cyberspace: Applying the Fair Use Defense to Inline Note
Service Providers, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 809, 843-845 (2001) (arguing for an application
of fair use that would allow Internet service providers to continue the use of inline notes).
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legal uncertainty in applying copyright law to the dissemination of infor-
mation through new mediums.
In December 2004, Google revealed a two-part plan to scan the books of
the New York Public Library and the libraries of Harvard University, Stan-
ford University, Oxford University, and the University of Michigan to cre-
ate an online card catalog and to make each scanned book searchable
online through the Google Book Search Project (formerly titled Google
Print). In response, the Authors Guild,5 an organization advocating for
published writers, along with several individual writers, brought a class
action suit against Google for copyright infringement, seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief' Google's defense rests heavily on its belief that the
works displayed through the Book Search Project qualify as fair use.7 The
case forces to the forefront the issue of the application of copyright protec-
tions and exceptions in the face of growing dissemination of information
through the Internet, particularly in the creation of digital libraries in addi-
tion to the Google Book Search project itself.8
Copyright law developed to encourage the creation of works for public
benefit.9 It grants exclusive rights to the creators of works of original au-
thorship, including literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works."° These
exclusive rights include the right to reproduce the copyrighted works, pre-
pare derivative works, and to distribute the copies." Yet Congress believed
these monopoly rights required limitations to allow the public to use and
thus fully benefit from the creation of these works. 12 Consequently, a num-
4 Elizabeth Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use? 2005 DuKE L. & TECH. REV.
10, 1 (2005), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/PDF/2005DLTR00 10.pdf (arguing that
Google is unlikely to succeed in a claim of fair use against the Authors Guild under the
traditional four factor analysis).
5 The Authors Guild is a professional society of over 8000 published authors working
to improve the rights of authors, for instance increasing their ability to contract and boost
royalties. The legal staff of the Guild works to aid authors in agency contracts as well as
intervene on their behalf in public disputes. See The Authors Guild-History,
http://www.authorsguild.org/?p=51 (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
Complaint at 13, The Authors Guild v. Google, No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://pub.bna.com/eclr/05cv8136comp.pdf [hereinafter Com-
plaint].
7 See generally Paul Ganley, Google Book Search: Fair Use, Fair Dealing and the
Case for Intermediary Copying 6-7 (Baker & McKenzie, LLP Working Paper, January 13,
2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=875384. Ganley argues that the Google Book
Search project has a chance of succeeding in its fair use claim within the U.S. Courts, Id.
8 See Travis, supra note 1, at 762-65 (arguing for reforms in the current copyright law
to incentivize increased creation of digital libraries).
9 See Kim, supra note 3, at 816.
10 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (setting forth the exclusive rights granted to creators of a
copyrighted product).
I d.
12 Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-108 (setting forth limita-
tions on the exclusive rights of authors); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
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ber of statutory and common law exceptions have evolved, creating de-
fenses to copyright infringement liability and allowing for uses that do not
impinge upon the original owner's incentive to create. 13
One of the most important exceptions developed by Congress is known
as "fair use."' 4 The doctrine of fair use permits the limited use of a copy-
righted work without permission from the owner in circumstances where
the usage will not undermine the original author's incentive to create.
15
There are no clear rules for determining what constitutes fair use. Rather,
the ambiguity of the statute allows for a case-by-case application.' 6 Be-
cause no categorical rules exist for the types of use that are fair or unfair,
courts are able to take into consideration the specific circumstances sur-
rounding each cause of action before making a determination. 17 As the
Supreme Court noted, the "equitable rule of reason"'" framework in the
fair use doctrine "permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity that law is
designed to foster."' 9 This flexible analysis has gained particular utility in
copyright disputes arising from unforeseen circumstances created by new
technologies. E0
U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (noting that creating exceptions to allow for certain uses of copy-
righted works helps promote the creation of arts and science).
13 Copyright law includes sixteen statutory exceptions to copyright infringement along
with several common law exceptions (estoppel, de minimis use, and implied license). Many
of these statutory provisions have specific applications only, such as those applying to satel-
lite broadcasters, while others like fair use are more flexible and may apply to the use of
any copyrighted works. See KENNETH CREWS, NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., COPYRIGHT LAW
FOR THE DIGITAL LIBRARY: FRAMEWORK OF RIGHTS AND EXCEPTIONS 5-9 (2001),
http://dml.indiana.edu/pdf/CopyrightLawforDLibFramework.pdf (discussing the limitations
on the exclusive rights of copyright holders).
14 17 U.S.C. § 107. See June Besek, Copyright: What Makes a Use "Fair," 38
EDUCAUSE REv. 12 (2003), available at
http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/erm0368.pdf, see also CREWS, supra note 13, at 5.
'
5 17 U.S.C. § 107 (allowing avoidance of copyright infringement liability if defendant
can establish that the use will not harm the original owner's incentive to create and will
allow the original owner to continue gaining the benefits of their creation). To determine
whether a defendant has established fair use, the courts evaluate the copied works based on
four factors set forth in the statute. See id.
16 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (directing courts to weigh the four factors set forth in
17 U.S.C. § 107 to determine whether fair use applies to exempt defendants from copyright
infringement charges).
17 See Besek, supra note 14, at 12.
18 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65--66 (1976)).
19 Iowa State Univ. Res. Found. Inc. v. American Broad Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980).
20 See Besek, supra note 14, at 12. "[T]he ambiguity of the fair use doctrine is also its
strength because it allows courts to apply fair use to new and sometimes completely unan-
ticipated uses of copyrighted works." Id.
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Recent advances in information reproduction and transmission technol-
ogy have sparked calls for changes in the applications of copyright law and
the fair use exemption to enable the growth of new technology.21 One
widely debated issue is whether the creation of online libraries is permissi-
ble under current copyright law and whether the statutes should be changed
to accommodate their creation." As the Internet continues to grow as an
information resource, scholars have called for increased digital access to
sources of information through the creation of digital libraries.2 3 Despite
successful small-scale attempts, the current status of copyright law has
impeded the creation of larger online libraries.24 Though Congress has
noted the benefits of such libraries, 5 no legislative initiative has developed
to create allowances for their development. The Google Book Search Pro-
ject is one of the few attempts to create such a library despite the current
status of copyright law.
With little guidance from Congress on how to apply copyright law to
cases involving the display of works on the Internet, lower courts have
developed varying interpretations of fair use. 6 Recently, the District Court
of the District of Nevada applied a unique interpretation of what consti-
21 See Travis, supra note 1. at 763-65 (calling for a more flexible application of copy-
right law and warning against a potential movement by copyright owners for a more strin-
gent application of the law); but see Raymond T. Nimmer, Contemporary Intellectual Prop-
erty, Licensing & Information Law, Google Lawsuit Begins; Fair Use,
http://www.ipinfoblog.com/archives/intellectual-property-google-lawsuit-begins-fair-
use.html (Oct. 3, 2005) (expressing hopes that courts will not undertake the expansive view
of copyright law necessary to allow for the Google Book Search Project to qualify as fair
use).
22 See generally Travis, supra note 1; see also Peter Lyman, Archiving the World Wide
Web, in BUILDING A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DIGITAL PRESERVATION ISsUES IN DIGITAL
MEDIA ARCHIVING (Apr. 2002), available at
htt ://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub/06/pub/06.pdf.
3 Travis, supra note 1, at 763-64.
24 Id. at 765. Travis notes that "[u]nless courts stop denying fair use arguments when-
ever a merely potential harm may be imagined, they will outlaw efforts to build digital
libraries through caching, linking to, and framing copyrighted material." Id.
25 In recognition of the benefits provided by digital libraries, Congress attempted to
digitize the works within the Library of Congress in order to "[harness] new technology as
it fulfills its mission 'to sustain and preserve a universal collection of knowledge and crea-
tivity for future generations." See Library of Congress-American Memory Project,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammern/about/index.html. (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
6 Compare Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) and Field v.
Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) with Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.
Supp. 2d 828 (C.D.C.A. 2006) and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). The differences between each case's finding of fair use highlights the
varying judicial interpretations across judicial circuits on how the commercial nature of a
defendant along with the public benefit provided by the copyrighted works affect a deter-
mination of fair use.
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tutes fair use in its holding in Field v. Google.27 Field represented an op-
portunity for a federal court to clarify how copyright law, and particularly
the fair use exemption, applies to the issue of whether Internet search en-
gines can distribute and reproduce works of authors through "caching."2 In
its fair use analysis, the Field court added an evaluation of good faith to the
statutory guidelines based on the "equitable balance of a fair use determi-
nation." 29
The framework set forth in Field allowed the Nevada District Court to
construe copyright law to encourage the development of new technology
that the court believed was beneficial to the public.3" The District Court for
the Southern District of New York should adopt this framework to find for
Google in the Authors Guild case. Although the court has not adopted a
Field-like framework in prior fair use cases, it has shown a willingness to
evaluate the defendant's conduct and good faith actions in analyses where
the infringement was demonstrated to benefit the public. 31 The Authors
Guild case presents the court with a chance to set forth how copyright law
is to be applied to newer mediums. A more liberal application, such as the
approach taken in Field, favors the Google Book Search project and would
establish protections for future digital library projects.32
27 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1118-23 (applying the four factors set forth in the statute along
with an evaluation of the defendant's good faith in evaluating whether or not their copying
constituted fair use).
28 "Caching" occurs when Web browsers store the data on previously visited Web pages
into their servers' memory (known as RAM). The storage of Web sites in a network's cache
memory allows browsers faster access to the contents of the site by allowing the browser to
avoid searching the Internet for the information since it is already stored in its RAM. The
problem that arises out of the caching is that it interferes with the Web site's ability to con-
trol what users view. This is particularly problematic for Web sites displaying time-
sensitive information. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 136-37
(CMP Books) (22nd ed. 2006).
29 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. The majority in Field found authority to use good
faith in its fair use analysis because "[tihe Copyright Act authorizes courts to consider other
factors than the four non-exclusive factors discussed above." Id.
30 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (holding Google's actions benefited the public by
allowing users to access information through a link to the cached Web site for times when
the original Web site was inaccessible or users wanted to compare changes to the Webpage
over time by comparing the original site to the cached Web site).
31 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d
324, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (using a consideration of whether the defendants actions in copy-
ing the original works were in good faith as part of the balancing of fair use factors); see
also Kane v. Comedy Partners, 2003 WL 22383387 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003). When
evaluating fair use "courts occasionally consider whether the defendant exercised good
faith." Id.
32 See Posting of Dan Cohen, Impact of Field v. Google on the Google Library Project,
http://www.dancohen.org/blog/posts/impact-of field_v googleon the google librarypro
ject (Feb. 9, 2006, 11:53 EST) [hereinafter Impact] (claiming that because the Google Book
Search Project's features closely resemble those the Nevada District Court held as good
faith in Field, if the Southern District of New York were to evaluate this factor in the Au-
2007]
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This Note begins by explaining why digital libraries, particularly those
accessible by the public via the Internet, are important and should be en-
couraged. Next, it outlines the development of copyright law in both the
District Courts for the Southern District of New York and the District of
Nevada. An analysis of previous copyright cases demonstrates that the fate
of the Google Book Search Project hinges on whether Google can establish
a viable fair use defense. This Note argues that the District Court for the
Southern District of New York should adopt the Field framework for the
analysis of fair use, and that the evaluation of good faith under this frame-
work will guide the court to find for Google. In addition to aiding Google's
ability to continue its Book Search project, the adoption of the Field fair
use analytical framework will promote the creation of other digital libraries
and future innovations in information dissemination by removing the legal
barrier.33
II. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT DERIVED FROM ONLINE LIBRARIES
In collecting, preserving, and sharing works of knowledge with their
communities, libraries are "one of civilization's great traditions."34 How-
ever, libraries can only provide their communities a small portion of avail-
able information due to the restrictions of their physical boundaries.35
Moreover, materials that are loaned are often lost or destroyed, presenting
challenges to libraries' attempts to preserve hard-copy works.3
6
Digital libraries offer useful alternatives to their physical counterparts.
They can better preserve and store materials, and, because there are no true
space restrictions, they can grant access to a greater array of information.
Because of the ease of networking between multiple databases, digital li-
thors Guild case, the advantage would swing in Google's favor). It should also be noted that
an alternative means of removing legal barriers to the creation of digital libraries is by legis-
lative action to change the law. While scholars have proposed several changes that would
help the creation of such libraries, Congress has yet to develop any such initiative, see
Travis, supra note 1 at 764-65 (arguing that the current status of copyright law impedes the
creation of online libraries and proposing changes in the law that would create greater in-
centives for the development of such libraries).
33 It should be noted that federal copyright law contains a preemption clause, stating
that United States federal law prevails in any conflict over copyright. While state law is
applicable in terms of deciding remedies, courts must only look to federal law in deciding
whether or not copyright infringement has occurred. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
34 Lieutenant Governor of Alberta, Canada, Lois E. Hole, Address at Reopening of
Spruce Branch, Edmonton Public Library Speech (Sept. 13, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.epl.ca/EPLImportanceOfLibraries.cfm) (discussing the general importance of
public libraries and their roles within communities).
35 PRESIDENT'S INFO. TECH. COMM., REPORT TO PRESIDENT: DIGITAL LIBRARIES:
UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 6-7 (2001) [hereinafter REPORT TO
PRESIDENT], available at http://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/pitac/pitac-dl-9feb01.pdf (supporting
governmental aid in the creation of digital libraries because of the benefits to the public).
36 See Travis, supra note 1, at 763.
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braries are able to offer a wider expanse of accessible material to their us-
ers. The growth of the Internet has created even greater uses for digital
libraries as their materials can now be universally accessible.
3 7
Currently, access to over 550 billion documents is available through the
Internet-more than fifty times the works available in the Library of Con-
gress. 38 With over 100 million Americans using the Internet and over one
billion computers worldwide connected to this information source,39 the
Internet has become most of the population's "information source of first
resort. '40 The growth of digital technology has not only increased the ease
of information reproduction, storage, and preservation, but has also made
information available for worldwide access. 41 The realization of the vast
amounts of information sought and available through the Internet has led
scholars and members of the government to express growing hopes that all
library materials will one day be cataloged into a searchable online data-
base accessible to the general public.42
The vast societal benefits that may result from the creation of digital li-
braries are still being contemplated.43 The greatest benefit could be the
elimination of geographical barriers, allowing the Internet to be a gateway
for those who do not reside near physical libraries to access the world's
knowledge base." Another benefit is the archiving ability of digital net-
works that would ensure greater preservation of knowledge. 45 Along with
increasing access to and preservation of materials, digital libraries make
researching information more efficient by making works searchable and
also allowing users to choose the method in which their requested informa-
tion is displayed.46
Recognizing the benefits of a digital library, the Library of Congress be-
gan the American Memory Project which seeks to create a national digital
37 See REPORT TO PRESIDENT, supra note 35, at 1-4 (discussing the important roll of the
Internet in creating worldwide access to information).
38 See LYMAN, supra note 22, at 1.
39 Travis, supra note 1, at 768.
40 Id. at 763.
41 Id. at 765-67.
42 See Travis, supra note 1, at 763. Recent technological progress has made it "feasible
to create open access, efficiently searchable, infinitely reproducible digital libraries on the
scale of the world's great physical libraries." Id See also REPORT TO PRESIDENT, supra note
35 (discussing the important benefits of digital libraries and the role the government must
take to ensure their creation); The Library of Congress-American Memory Project,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/about/index.html (attempting to digitize portions of the
Library of Congress in light of the many benefits to be gained from digital libraries).
43 REPORT TO PRESIDENT, supra note 35, at 5.
44 See generally Travis, supra note 1; see also REPORT To PRESIDENT, supra note 35, at
1. The report claims that if digital libraries were to come into existence "no classroom,
group, or person is ever isolated from the world's greatest knowledge resources." Id.
41 Travis, supra note 1, at 764.
46 REPORT TO PRESIDENT, supra note 35, at 3.
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library through public initiative. 47 By digitizing recorded, print, and photo-
graphic media, by 2002 the American Memory Project made five million
of the Library of Congress' works available online.48 Despite the desire to
use the Internet to create a digital library, the project has developed slowly
due to budget issues, resulting in a limited display of the Library of Con-
gress' breadth of materials.49
Smaller scale private initiatives have also sought to develop online digi-
tal libraries.5" Currently, Web sites like Findlaw.com and WebMD offer
freely accessible information concerning particular fields of specialty.5
Unfortunately, such small scale creations do not allow users to search a
variety of subject areas at once, leaving large gaps in what information is
organized and publicly searchable.
Larger private initiatives, such as JSTOR and LexisNexis, have devel-
oped libraries encompassing a wider variety of information. 2 Yet because
of the subscription costs required to search these larger libraries, the gen-
eral public has not benefited from access to digital information made pos-
sible by the Internet.53 Google's Book Search project seeks to reconcile the
open access provided by public initiatives with the efficiency of privately
funded projects.5 4 The Google's Book Search project could accomplish
Congress's goals of utilizing the Internet "to sustain and preserve a univer-
sal collection of knowledge and creativity for future generations"55 in a
more efficient and less costly manner.
47 The Library of Congress-American Memory Project,
http://memorv.loc.gov/ammem/about/index.html (explaining that the American Memory
Project was Congress's attempt to harness new technology and create an online digital
library for the general public to access).
48 id.
49 See Travis, supra note 1, at 770 (noting that only a few thousand of the over twenty-
six million books held by the Library of Congress have been digitized as a result of the
American Memory project).
50 See id. at 769.
51 Findlaw.com offers free access to court decisions, statutes and other legal articles
while WebMD offers searchable medical information. See id; see also Findlaw.com,
http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2006); WebMd, http://www.webmd.com
(last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
52 See Travis, supra note 1, at 772-775.
" Id. at 773.
54 Id. at 776-77. Since Google announced its intentions to create the Google Book
Search Project, several similar projects have also been announced. In 2005, Microsoft an-
nounced a plan to digitize works from a British Library whose copyright had expired. Later
in 2005, Yahoo also announced a similar plan to create a digital library where authors may
opt-in to have their works displayed, see Ruth Allen, Google Library: Why All the Fuss, 23
COPYRIGHT REP., 105-06, Dec. 2005, available at
http://www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdfa05n24.pdf.
5 Library of Congress-American Memory Project, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/
about/index.html (follow "about" hyperlink). The American Memory Project is Congress's
attempt to harness new technology and create an online digital library for the general public
to access. Id.
[Vol. 15
Fair Use & The Google Book Search Project
III. AN OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW
While public policy arguments will play a role in the Southern District of
New York's decision, it is important first to understand the basics of copy-
right law and the defenses available to those charged with infringement.
The sections below will establish the legal standards as developed in the
jurisdictions of both the Field case and the Authors Guild case by looking
at both district court and appellate court rulings. Therefore, the standards
set by the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, along with the Su-
preme Court, will play a significant role in developing the precedents pro-
viding authority for the Field decision and will apply to the Authors Guild
case.
Section A begins by describing the rights of copyright holders under fed-
eral copyright law and the elements that must be proven to establish a
prima facie case of copyright infringement. Section B sets forth several
defenses available to those accused of infringement, with special attention
to the fair use defense. Finally, Section C describes the Field case and out-
lines the new analysis of fair use set forth by the District of Nevada, which
includes an evaluation of whether the defendant acted in good faith.
A. Copyright Law's Response to Technology
The primary purpose of copyright law is found in the Constitution, vest-
ing in Congress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries., 5 6 In response to this
grant of authority, Congress granted time-limited monopoly rights to copy-
right holders based on the belief that such rights would advance public
welfare by incentivizing the creation of those works the Constitution
sought to promote."
Despite the exclusive rights the Constitution granted to copyright own-
ers, Congress has since carved out exceptions to these rights.5 8 The pur-
pose of these exceptions is to further promote science and the arts by al-
lowing members of the public to "build freely upon the ideas and informa-
tion conveyed by a [copyrighted] work., 59 As a result, statutory amend-
ments and common law exceptions have developed defenses to copyright
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (setting forth the exclusive rights of copyright holders). See
also Mazer v. Stein, 343 U.S. 201, 219 (1952) (discussing the philosophy behind the grant-
ing of exclusive rights); Kim, supra note 3, at 816.
58 See, e.g., Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright Law, §§ 17 U.S.C. 107-108 (setting
forth exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright holders).
59 See Kim, supra note 3, at 816.
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
60infringement; fair use is the most widely applicable of these exceptions.
Over the last few decades, however, Congress has amended the Copyright
Act to expand the exclusive rights of certain creators, and to create greater
civil and criminal sanctions for certain types of infringement."I The most
notable of these amendments is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), passed in 1998 in order to update copyright law in response to
changes in technology. 62
The passage of the DMCA was a congressional reaction to the develop-
ment of new technology and the ease with which digital works are repro-
duced.63 The DMCA sought to eliminate Internet piracy by criminalizing
the production and dissemination of copyrighted works through the Inter-
net and raised penalties for such infringement. 64 It allows for sentences of
up to ten years for certain criminal infringement actions. 65 The DMCA also
permits copyright owners to force third parties to remove from Internet
sites materials that they believe infringe on their copyright.6 6 While in-
creasing the responsibilities of Internet service providers, the DCMA also
limits their liability for copyright infringement in certain circumstances,
including the transmission of copyrighted information over the Internet.67
Though the DCMA does directly apply to the copyright issues surrounding
digital libraries, its creation, particularly the statutory limitations, shows a
willingness on Congress' part to modify copyright law as technology con-
tinues to change.68
60 See, e.g., §§ 17 U.S.C. 107-108 (setting forth exceptions to the exclusive rights of
copyright holders). See also Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.
1998) (allowing defendant to establish a defense of de minimis copyright for the unauthor-
ized use of copyrighted photographs in a film); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106,
1116 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that defendant, Google, could establish a defense of an im-
plied license for the display of a cached Web site because plaintiff handed the works over to
defendant with the awareness that it would be cached).
61 See DOUG ISENBERG, THE GIGA LAW 36-38 (Random House 2002).
62 The Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in sections of 17 U.S.C., and in 28 U.S.C. § 4001); see also
Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Leg-
acy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REv 1836, 1858 (discussing how the DMCA was
enacted as a Congressional response to changes in technology).
63 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. at 2875-2876 (1998); See also ISENBERG, supra note
60.
64 The UCLA Online Inst. for Cyberspace Law and Pol'y, The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/dmcal.htm (last visited Mar. 25 2007).
See ISENBERG, supra note 61, at 19.
66 See NEWTON, supra note 28, at 300.
67 See generally, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. at 2877-2887 (1998) (setting forth the
extent and the limitations of the new obligations imposed on Internet service providers
through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
68 See Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1861-62. Samuelson claims that though the DMCA
expands the exclusive rights of copyright holders to a degree, read in light of Sony, these
provisions should be construed narrowly so as not to stifle innovation and contends that the
existence of the safe harbor provisions supports this contention. Id.
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B. Elements of Copyright Law and Infringement
Authors of a vast array of creative works may apply for monopoly rights
over their creations. 69 If awarded a copyright, the author holds the exclu-
sive rights to: (1) reproduce copies of his works; (2) prepare derivative
works; (3) distribute his works; and (4) perform or display his works.7
To establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement, a plaintiff
must demonstrate both ownership of a copyright and unauthorized copying
by the defendant.7 Section 101 of the Copyright Act identifies copying as
the reproduction of works by "any method now known or later devel-
oped., 72 Therefore, the copied works need not be displayed within the
same medium to establish infringement.73
C. Defenses to Copyright Infringement
Every unauthorized use of a copyrighted work does not necessarily con-
stitute infringement. Defendants may assert one or more of several affirma-
tive defenses to prove that the copying was permissible under the circum-
stances. These defenses include the common law defenses of de minimis
copying and implied license, as well as explicit statutory defenses to copy-
right infringement liability set forth in the library and fair use exemptions.
69 Copyright Office Basics, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circl.html#wccc (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2007).
70 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (setting forth the exclusive rights of copyright owners).
71 See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (hold-
ing that to establish the prima facie case of copyright infringement plaintiff must prove (1)
ownership of a copyright and (2) copying of the original works); Castle Rock Entm't v.
Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that to establish the prima facie
case of copyright infringement a plaintiff must prove that his works were actually copied
and that the copying amounts to an improper and unlawful appropriation); see also
ISENBERG, supra note 61, at 5 (citing Playboy v. Sanfilippo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5125
(S.D.Cal. 1998)).
72 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (setting forth the definitions of terms used throughout copy-
right law). "Copies" are defined as "material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." Id.
73 See generally, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see also Emily Anne Proskine, Note:
Google 's Technicolor Dreamcoat: a Copyright Analysis of the Google Book Search Library
Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 228 (2006). Proskine notes that "the medium through
which a work is transmitted is largely inconsequential, so long as the works are substan-
tively the same." Id.
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1. Common Law Defenses to Copyright Infringement
a. The De Minimis Copying Defense
The defense of de minimis copying is rooted in the theory that negligible
uses of copyrighted works should not incur infringement liability when the
copying is too insignificant to constitute a case for the courts.74 The de-
fense establishes that, "where unauthorized copying is sufficiently trivial,
the law will not impose legal consequences" for copyright infringement.75
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have similar guidelines for establishing
this defense, considering whether the use is not only minimal but whether
the copied portion would be recognizable by an average audience. 76 De-
spite these guidelines, no brightline test exists for what actually constitutes
de minimis use, largely due to a paucity of recorded cases in which the de
minimis defense prevailed.77 This lack of caselaw can be explained by the
reluctance of owners of a copyright to bring a claim of infringement when
uses are truly de minimis.75
b. The Implied License Defense
When a copyright owner consents to the use of a work by another per-
son, he or she waives the right to bring infringement claims. 7 The consent
of the copyright owner need not be formalized in an explicit license, but
may instead be inferred by an implied license.80 Due to the narrow applica-
74 See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Allen,
supra note 54, at 107.
7 See On Davis, 246 F.3d at 172.
76 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defen-
dant's use of a three note, six second segment of a copyrighted jazz compilation during a
performance was de minimis because the appropriation would not be recognized by an
average audience); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998)
(citing Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74) (holding that the use of
a plaintiff's copyrighted photographs in a movie qualified as de minimis when neither the
photographs nor their subject matter was displayed with detail that would be sufficient for a
layperson to identify the copyrighted works).
7 See On Davis, 246 F.3d at 173 ("The de minimis doctrine is rarely discussed in copy-
right opinions because suits are rarely brought over trivial instances of copying.").
78 id.
79 See, e.g., De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)
(holding that a license allows any licensee to escape liability for infringement).
80 See, e.g., De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co., 273 U.S. at 241. An implied license may
exist where a defendant "may properly infer that the owner consents to his use." Id. See also
Keane Dealer Servs. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); IAE, Inc., v. Shaver,
74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115-16 (D.
Nev. 2006).
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tion of this doctrine, it is difficult for defendants to succeed on this de-
fense.
In A&MRecords v. Napster, the Ninth Circuit clarified this narrow view,
stating that an implied license is only applicable in the event that a copy-
right owner hands his or her works over to the alleged infringer at that per-
son's request with the intention that the works be copied or redistributed.82
However, both the District Courts for the Southern District of New York
and the District of Nevada have recently taken a more liberal position on
what constitutes an implied license. In Field, the Nevada District Court
found that because the plaintiff, Mr. Field, was aware of Google's copying
and failed to prevent it, Google could assert an implied license defense. 3
This broader application of implied license was also proposed by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Keane Dealer Service v. Hart.84 There, the court held that an
implied license may be given "in the form of mere permission or lack of
objection. ' ' 85 Despite the language in the Keane and Field opinions, both
cases presented a factual circumstance to which the narrow requirements of
Napster could be applied. Neither case ventured to discuss whether failure
to "opt-out" of a program constitutes an implied license.86
2. Statutory Defenses to Copyright Infringement: The Library Exemption
The statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright holders
permit several affirmative defenses to charges of infringement. The de-
fenses most applicable to the creation of digital libraries are the Library
Exemption and the Fair Use Exemption.87
81 See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P., v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d
21, 25 (2nd Cir. 1990) (preventing defendant from succeeding on a claim of an implied
license because the facts did not fall into the narrow application of this doctrine); Pavlica v.
Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. John
Doe Nos. 1-25, 172 F. Supp. 2d 383, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
82 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1026 (citing SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P.,
211 F.3d at 25) (explaining that an implied license is not created merely because the plain-
tiff was aware that his work could be reproduced).
83 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (holding that a plaintiff's failure to prevent defendant
from caching his Web site so that it could be displayed on the defendant's search engine site
resulted in conduct that could be interpreted as an implied license to use plaintiff's works).
84 Keane Dealer Servs., 968 F. Supp. at 947 (citing IAE Inc., 74 F.3d at 755). This case
notes that "while exclusive licenses must be in writing, 'a nonexclusive license may be
granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct... In fact consent given in the form
of mere permission or lack of objection is also equivalent to a nonexclusive license and is
not required to be in writing." Id.
85 Id.
86 See id.; Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
87 Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-108 (2000).
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The library exemption creates an exception for libraries to make copies
of their holdings.88 Despite the broad definition that can be used to de-
scribe libraries, this exemption is narrowly applied in practice. 89 Although
the statute does not define the meaning of "library," the legislative history
shows that any definition is to be narrowly construed.9" The House Com-
mittee Report on the 1976 Copyright Act reveals that Congress intended to
limit the applicability of this exemption.91 The House reported that this
exemption does not permit "a non-profit institution, by means of contrac-
tual arrangements with a commercial copying enterprise, to authorize the
enterprise to carry out copying and distribution functions that would be
exempt if conducted by the non-profit institution."92 The District Court for
the Southern District of New York upheld this view in Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko Geographics Corp., disallowing commercial copy centers from as-
serting that copying library materials constituted non-commercial use un-
der the library exemption.93
The growth of the Internet also raises the question of whether the library
exemption could be extended to virtual libraries. 94 In passage of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, the Senate explicitly declared that any
libraries existing in only the virtual sense do not qualify as libraries under
federal law. 95 Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that online databases
labeling themselves as "electronic libraries" do not qualify for the library
exemption.96 Thus, only physical libraries may assert the library exemption
as a defense. 97
88 17 U.S.C. § 108. Under the library exemption, libraries may make copies of their own
materials as long as they are: "(1) only a single copy; (2) made by the library or a library
employee in the scope of their employment; (3) that the copying is not to be associated with
any commercial purpose; (4) the copies are made from collections that are open to the pub-
lic; and (5) the copies include a notice of copyright." Id. See also Hanratty, supra note 4,
8. 89 Hanratty, supra note 4, 8-13.
90 See id. 9.
91 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 74 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5688.
92 Id.
93 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko Geographics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1531, 1547
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that defendant could not defend against infringement liability for
copjing excerpts from a copyrighted book to create course packets for students).
9 See Hanratty, supra note 4, 10.
9' S. REP. No. 105-109 at 62 (1998) (Digital Millennium Copyright Act). This report
notes that
[a]lthough online interactive digital networks have since given birth to online digital
'libraries' and 'archives' that exist only in the virtual (rather than physical) sense on
Web sites, bulletin boards and homepages across the Internet, it is not the Committee's
intent that section 108 as revised apply to such collections of information.
Id.
96 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 501 n.12 (2001) (holding that the library
exemption under 17 U.S.C. § 108 did not apply to database reproductions).
97 See, e.g, id.; S. REP. No. 105-109, at 62 (1998); Hanratty, supra note 4, 8-10.
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D. The Fair Use Exemption
Federal law established a second statutory exemption to liability for
copyright infringement by creating a fair use defense. 98 This is the most
well known defense to charges of infringement. 99 Though fair use limits
the exclusive rights of authors, it advances the intent of copyright law by
creating allowances for users to "build upon the content of a work of au-
thorship."' 0 0 In order to evaluate a fair use defense, the courts must address
the four factors set forth in the fair use statute: (1) the purpose and charac-
ter of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted works; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use on the mar-
ket for the copyrighted work.'"o The Supreme Court noted in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music that no one factor alone is dispositive in establishing fair
use. 10 2 Instead, the Court held that each of the four factors "are to be ex-
plored [separately] and the results weighed together in light of the purpose
of copyright [law]."'01 3 Unfortunately, neither Campbell nor the fair use
statute gives courts any guidance on the relative weight each factor should
be awarded."04
Along with Campbell, courts often look to both the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Sony v. Universal City Studios (Betamax)'05 and the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Kelly v. Arriba Software Corporation.6 for guidance in cases
involving Internet technology. The framework applied in Betamax pro-
vides an example of how copyright law is to be applied to issues arising
out of new technologies.' 07 Most notably, it creates flexibility for courts in
deciding what qualifies as a transformative use." 8 The analysis in Arriba
98 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (setting forth the factors that must be evaluated in deciding
whether a use of a copyrighted works falls under fair use).
99 See Besek, supra note 14, at 12.
100 See Kim, supra note 3, at 819.
10' 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also id.
102 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (holding that defen-
dant could establish a fair use defense for a rap parody of plaintiffs rock ballad even
though the parody was commercial in nature when sufficient consideration was given to the
other elements of fair use set forth in § 107).
103 Id. at 578.
104 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Vol. 4, § 13.05 [A],
at 13-159 (no. 70 2006) [hereinafter NIMMER].
105 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g
Group, 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2nd Cir. 1998).
106 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, 448 F.3d 605, 611 (2nd Cir.
2006); Video Pipeline, Inc., v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 199 (3rd Cir.
2003); Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118-23 (D. Nev. 2006).
107 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 432
(1984); see also Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1841-1849.
108 See Betamax, 464 U.S. at 432. For a full discussion on what constitutes a transforma-
tive use, see notes 117-150 and accompanying text.
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also provides an example of how defendants may establish transformative
uses and fair use overall. Arriba is often cited in cases involving the Inter-
net and search engines as it provides the leading example for evaluating
fair use in "the context of digitization."'' 09
1. The Purpose and Character of the Defendant's Use
Courts must answer two important questions in evaluating the purpose
and character of an infringing use. They must first establish whether the
use is commercial or non-commercial."' Then they must determine
whether the work merely supersedes the original work or transforms the
nature of the original work."'
a. Is the Use Commercial?
The Supreme Court has held that a use is commercial if the defendant is
able to "profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying
the customary price.""' 2 Both the Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit courts have taken a broad view in deciding whether a use is
commercial because of indirect commercial benefits."' Defendants in
these jurisdictions have been the denied fair use defense because of the
commercial character of using copyrighted works in unsponsored televi-
sion broadcasts "' and in magazine publications by non-profit institu-
109 See Proskine, supra note 73, at 224; see also Allen, supra note 54, at 108.
"' 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1) (2000). The statute requires courts to "consider" the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes" in an evaluation of fair use. Id.
"'1 See id.; see also, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). In
Campbell, the Supreme Court noted that in evaluating the purpose and character of an in-
fringing use, "the central purpose of this investigation is to see ... whether and to what
extent the new work is 'transformative."' Id.
112 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1984) (holding
that defendant, by publishing quotes from the President's unpublished memoirs, could not
establish a claim for fair use based on the purpose and character of its use because the sole
purpose of the defendant's use was motivated by commercial gain).
113 See, e.g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp.
1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2nd Cir. 1982). The District Court de-
nied CBS's argument that its use of copyrighted materials in an unsponsored television
broadcast was not commercial under the purpose and character test because "experience
suggests that CBS stood to gain at least indirect commercial benefit from the ratings boost
which it had reason to hope would (and in fact did) result from the special." Id. See also,
Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[Tlhe mere
fact that Harper's is a non-profit organization that operates at a loss does not preclude a
finding of 'commercial use'.").
14 Roy Export Co., 503 F. Supp. at 1144, affd, 72 F.2d 1095; NIMMER, supra note 104,
§ 13.05 [A][1](c), at 13-172.
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tions. "5 Therefore, defendants must disprove that the "sole motive of use is
monetary gain" to overcome characterization as a commercial entity." 6
b. Is the Use Transformative?
Because an analysis of the purpose and character of the use does not end
at an evaluation of whether or not a user is a commercial entity, courts
must also evaluate whether the infringing work is transformative in nature
before it can establish fair use."1 7 Although the 1984 Supreme Court stated
in Betamax that every unauthorized commercial use is presumptively un-
fair,' 1 the Court has relaxed this stance over time out of concern that such
a test would be too restrictive. 119 Thus, courts have allowed defendants to
overcome the presumption of unfair use if they can prove their use is trans-
formative.'20 While no brightline test exists to determine what type of use
is transformative,' 21 Campbell held the new work must add new meaning
1" Lish, 807 F. Supp. at 1101 (preventing a non-profit defendant from claiming that its
use of a copyrighted letter was fair use because of the commercial nature of the copied
works).
116 NIMMER, supra note 104, § 13.05[A][1](c), at 13-176 (quoting Worldwide Church of
God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000).
117 The only exceptions to the requirement that a use be transformative are when the non-
transformative copying is for research purposes or for the purpose of news reporting. See
Duffy v. Penguin Books, USA Inc., 4. F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (photocopying
by the defendant of the copyrighted works qualifies as fair use because the purpose and
character of defendant's use was research); Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Co. Inc., 458
F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (establishing that the transmission of a copyrighted song over
a television broadcast was fair use based on the purpose and character of the use: news
reporting).
118 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984) (holding that defendant's sale of home video recorders to record copyrighted pro-
grams was fair use because the device merely allowed the user to view copyrighted pro-
grams at a later time and did not constitute substantial infringement).
119 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) ("If, indeed,
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption
would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107,
including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research."); see
also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[U]nduly
emphasizing the commercial motivation of a copier will lead to an overly restrictive view of
fair use.").
120 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The Court noted that if a defendant can establish
that the infringing use is transformative, "less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism." Id. See also, Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp, 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir.
2003); Texaco, 60 F.3d at 923; Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118-19 (D. Nev.
2006).
12 1 A transformative use is one that transforms the original work in composition, struc-
ture, outward appearance, character or condition. See definition of "transform" in MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1249 (10th ed. 2002).
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to the original use rather than supersede the original use. '22 In economic
terms, this test focuses on whether the new works are complementary
rather than substitutional.'23
Although the Betamax presumption that all commercial uses are not fair
uses has been modified, the case is still important to copyright law because
it expands the notion of transformative use with regard to technological
innovations. 124 Faced with the question of whether copying original works
through a new technology constituted fair use, the Supreme Court created a
new category of transformative uses in "time shifting."125 In Betamax, sev-
eral major motion picture companies brought suit against Sony, a manufac-
turer of home video cassette recorders ("VCRs"), for contributorily infring-
ing on their copyrights, alleging that Sony's VCR allowed its purchasers to
record copyrighted productions and view them "off the air."' 26 The motion
picture holders believed that the sale of VCRs would negatively affect the
sales of motion pictures. 27 The Court found that the copying merely al-
lowed users to "time-shift" their viewing of the copyrighted productions
such that no actual infringement ocgurs. 128 Therefore, because time-
shifting was a fair use, the VCR manufactures could not be responsible for
contributory infringement. 129 The Court's determination that the public
would benefit from the ability to time-shift programming was a factor in
permitting time-shifting as a transformative use.130 Public benefit was de-
fined as increased access to the "free flow of ideas, information and com-
merce," the primary purpose of copyright law.' 3 ' The decision displayed
the "willingness of the Court to balance new technological capabilities
against traditional principals of copyright law." 32
Like the Supreme Court in Betamax, the Ninth Circuit and the District
Court for the District of Nevada have also based findings of transformative
122 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (holding that because a rap music parody of a rock ballad
did not supplant the market demand for the original work, it could not supersede the copied
work).
123 See NiMMER, supra note 104, § 13.05 [A](1)(b), at 13-170 (citing Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns
Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2002)).
124 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984); see also Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1843-1845.
125 Betamax, 464 U.S. at 421.
126 Id. at 419-20.
127 Id. at 425.
128 Id. at 456.
129 Id. at 455-56.
130 Id. at 455 ("Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to television
programming may result in a comparable benefit.").I3 Id. at 429.
132 ROBIN JEWELER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH PROJECT:
IS ONLINE INDEXING A FAIR USE UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (2005), available at
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22356_20051228.pdf.
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use on the public benefit argument. 133 In Arriba, the defendant created a
search engine of Internet images by compiling a database of pictures from
Web sites without the consent of photographers. '34 Because the search en-
gine was found to "benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering
techniques on the [I]nternet,"'' 3' despite its commercial nature, the Ninth
Circuit found Arriba established the purpose and character of its use as fair
use based on the transformative nature of its creation. 136 Citing Arriba, the
District Court for the District of Nevada in Field found that caching and
display of a cached Web site by Google also was a transformative use be-
cause it allowed users to access materials that would otherwise be inacces-
sible. 13' As in Arriba, the Field court found for Google despite the com-
mercial nature of the use. 138
The Second Circuit and the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, on the other hand, have taken a narrower view on what quali-
fies as a transformative work, holding that an infringing use is not auto-
matically transformed by nature of incorporation into a new technology. 39
The District Court for the Southern District of New York best stated this
view in UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, holding that "repackag[ing] those
recordings to facilitate their transmission through another medium"' 4 ° is
not enough to qualify as a transformative use. Even if the repackaging is
innovative and could benefit the public by increasing access to the original
works, UMG shows that in order for a use to be transformative, the author
133 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
defendant's thumbnail display of a copyrighted photograph on its search engine Web site
qualified as fair use because the use aided information gathering and thus benefited the
public); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118-19 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding that
the cached Web site display by Google was transformative of the original site because of
the benefits it provided to the public).
134 Arriba, 336 F.3d 815-16.
131 Id. at 820.
136 Id.
13 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. The court noted that Google's display of links to
cached Web sites qualified as fair use under the purpose and character of the use test be-
cause, instead of providing a substitute for the original work, the "links allow users to locate
and access information that is otherwise inaccessible." Id.
138 Id. at 1119. The court allowed Google to establish its use as transformative
"[b]ecause Google serves different and socially important purposes in offering access to
copyrighted works through 'Cached' links and does not merely supersede the objectives of
the original creations .... Id.
139 See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding that the retransmission of the radio broadcast through dial-up Internet would bene-
fit the public by increasing access to the show, but could not qualify as a transformative use
because such benefit could be accomplished through other methods as well); see also UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (establishing that
the defendant's copying of plaintiffs recording onto computer servers did not constitute fair
use and was merely "repackaging" by reproducing the works on a different medium, and
therefore was not transformative in character).
140 UMG Recordings, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
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must add her own ideas to the copied works rather than merely create a
new means to view the works. 141
Furthermore, the recent case Perfect 10 v. Google demonstrates that even
if a work is transformative in character, an infringing use can be found if
the defendant derives a significant economic benefit from the use. 142 In
Perfect 10, the District Court for the Central District of California rejected
a fair use claim asserted by the search engine for actions similar to those of
the Arriba Software Corporation.' 43 The court distinguished Perfect 10
from Arriba, as Google's usage of Perfect 10's works resulted in revenue
gains for the company from displaying advertisements along side the
thumbnails of the works. 1" Accordingly, the court found Google's use to
be consumptive instead of transformative'45 due to the commercial benefit
the company derived, thus barring the company from asserting a viable fair
use claim. 146 Therefore, Perfect 10 demonstrates that the defendant's mo-
tivation for copying the original works is important in the evaluation of fair
use.
It should be noted that determining the transformative character of a use
is merely one factor in evaluating a defendant's claim of fair use. The Sec-
ond Circuit stated that it is not "absolutely necessary" for a work to be
transformative in order to find fair use. 148 Moreover, the Southern District
of New York has allowed defendants to claim fair use for non-
transformative copying if the usage is for research purposes149 or falls un-
der the protection of news reporting. '50
141 See NIMMER, supra note 104, § 13.05 [A][1](b), at 13-164.
141 See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 849 (C.D.Cal. 2006).
143 Id.
'44 Id. at 846.
145 The court held that Google's use was consumptive rather than transformative because
the infringing use was displayed on the Web site in order to derive commercial benefit
rather than provide a public benefit. Id. at 847.
146 Id. at 846-47. The court held that the gain of revenue from advertising displays "un-
questionably makes Google's use of thumbnails on its image search far more commercial
than Arriba's use in Kelly II." Id.
147 Id. at 846-47 (holding that Google's thumbnail display of Perfect 10's copyrighted
photos did not constitute fair use under the purpose and character of the use because Google
derived economic benefit from their display of the thumbnails through advertisements dis-
played on their search engine page).
148 See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108-109 (2d Cir. 1998) (disal-
lowing defendant from succeeding on a claim of fair use for the retransmission of the radio
broadcast though dial-up would benefit the public, because such benefit could be accom-
plished through other methods as well).
149 See, e.g., Duffy v. Penguin Books, USA Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(noting that photocopying copyrighted works may qualify as fair use based on the purpose
and character of the use when done for research purposes).
150 See, e.g., Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Co. Inc., 458 F. Supp. 65, 70-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (allowing defendant to disclaim infringement liability for the transmission
of a copyrighted song over a television broadcast as fair use based on the purpose and char-
acter of the use because it was for the purpose of news reporting).
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2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Works
Along with the purpose and character of the use, the fair use statute re-
quires an evaluation of the nature of the works copied in order to make a
determination of what is fair use. '51 Whereas it is more difficult to establish
a fair use defense when the type of work is creative in nature,'52 defendants
have an easier time establishing fair use on this factor when the works cop-
ied are factual in nature.'53 The rationale behind such findings is based on
the assumption that copyright law is intended to protect an author's incen-
tive to create.' 54 Therefore, allowing the copying of factual information
would be less harmful to the goal of copyright law than allowing for the
copying of creative works. '55
While a consideration of the nature of the copyrighted work is important
in the evaluation of a fair use defense, the Supreme Court noted in Camp-
bell that nature is less helpful in analyzing fair use when the purpose and
character of the use are deemed to be transformative. 156 Despite this claim,
many lower courts have continued to use this factor in their fair use evalua-
tion even after establishing that a use is transformative. 57
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
When a negligible amount of a copyrighted work is used, defendants
may assert the common law defense of de minimis copying."' Yet, usage
of copyrighted works need not be de minimis to prevent infringement li-
151 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2) (2000). The statute instructs courts to consider "the nature of the
copyrighted work" in its determination of fair use. Id.
152 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (holding that infringement by
basing a motion picture on a fictional story was not fair use because the work copied was
creative in nature); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563-64
(1984); Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding against the
defendant based on the nature of the copyrighted works because the photographs copied
were creative in nature); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120 (D. Nev. 2006)
(finding against the defendant based on the nature of the copyrighted works because the
Web site copied was creative in nature).
153 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d at 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1994) (al-
lowing the nature of the copyrighted works to weigh in Texaco's favor in a fair use analysis
for copying articles from the plaintiff's magazine and disseminating them among employ-
ees because the articles copied were primarily factual in nature).
154 Kim, supra note 3, at 816-817. The Copyright Act does not grant exclusive rights to
the use of factual ideas "because they lack the constitutional requirement of originality." Id.
at 817.
155 Hanratty, supra note 4, 22.
156 See, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994).
157 The courts in Arriba and Field, for example, took the nature of the copyrighted works
into account despite finding that the usage was transformative. Arriba, 336 F.3d at 820;
Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
158 See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]here
unauthorized copying is sufficiently trivial, the law will not impose legal consequences.").
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ability if the defendant can establish a claim of fair use.'59 This factor al-
lows for a finding of fair use where the use is more than de minimis, so
long as the amount and substantiality of the portion used does not harm the
author's incentive to create new works. 160
The Ninth Circuit has applied this factor liberally, finding situations in
which the copying of an entire copyrighted work is acceptable. '61 In Sega
Enters v. Accolade, the court established that the copying of a whole prod-
uct was acceptable as an intermediary step for reverse engineering. 162 The
court held that reverse engineering was fair use as long the final product
developed by the defendant does not contain any infringing material. 163 In
finding fair use, the court focused heavily on the necessity of the copying
in order for Accolade to be able to create its product.'64
Reverse engineering is not the only situation in which wholesale copying
has qualifed as fair use. 165 In Arriba, the Ninth Circuit held that copying
the entire work was acceptable because it was necessary for Arriba to al-
low user recognition. 166 The court held that a defendant can assert fair use
on the amount and substantiality of the portion used as long as he or she
"only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then this
'9 17 U.S.C. § 107 (3) (2000). The statute requires courts to evaluate "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole" in its de-
termination of fair use. Id.
160 Lloyd Rick, The Publishing Law Center, How Much of Someone Else's Work May I
Use Without Asking Permission: The Fair Use Doctrine, Part I, 2006,
http://www.publaw.com/work.html ("The critical determination is whether the quality and
value of the materials copied are reasonable in relation to the purpose of copying.").
161 See, e.g., Arriba, 336 F.3d at 820; Sega Enters. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526
(9th Cir. 1992).
162 See Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1526 (holding that defendant did not infringe on Sega
Enters copyright protection when the defendant copied and reverse engineered the manufac-
turer's video game to create its own). Reverse engineering occurs when programs are taken
apart in order to analyze their composition so that similar products may be created. See
NEWTON, supra note 28, at 676.
163 The cases of Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) and Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) held that the process of reverse engi-
neering fell within the fair use exception to copyright infringement as long as no portion of
the original work was displayed in the new product. This common law exception has since
been codified into Copyright law through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, creating a
statutory allowance for reverse engineering of computer programs when the results of the
copied program are not published. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000); see also ROBIN
JEWELER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ANTICIRCUMVENTION UNDER THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND REVERSE ENGINEERING: RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
5-6 (2004), available at http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RL32692 041210.pdf.
164 Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1526.
165 See, e.g., Arriba, 336 F.3d at 821; Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120-
21 (D. Nev. 2006). See also Bellmore v. City Pages Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 678 (D. Minn.
1995) (holding that defendant's publishing of a full article in defendant's newspaper for the
purpose of criticizing the article was fair use).
166 See Arriba, 336 F.3d at 821, See also Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-21.
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factor will not weigh against him or her."' 167 The District Court for the
Southern District of New York has echoed this view, holding that the find-
ing of fair use was based on whether defendant copied more than what was
necessary. 1
68
Although wholesale copying can be non-infringing, courts have also
found the use of relatively small portions of a copyrighted works to be
infringing.'69 In Campbell, the Supreme Court declared that analysis of the
amount and substantiality of the portion used "calls for thought not only
about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and impor-
tance, too."' 7 ° Therefore, copies of small portions of a copyrighted work
may be deemed infringing use if that small portion captures the "heart" of
the author's work."'7 In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises the Supreme Court clarified liability in situations in which small
portions of an author's work represent enough substance to negate a claim
of fair use. 172 Nation Enterprises published small portions of a political
figure's unpublished manuscript.'73 The Court found against its claim of
fair use on the amount and substantiality of the portion used because, de-
spite the fact that only small amounts of the copyrighted works were used,
the published portions were the most interesting parts, deemed "the heart
of the book."'
174
Despite Harper & Row, a 2003 Ninth Circuit case, Video Pipeline v.
Buena Vista Home Entertainment, indicates that minimal copying will
generally lead to a fair use finding based on the quantity copied because it
is difficult for such portions to represent the "heart" of a copyrighted
work. 171 In Video Pipeline, defendants were sued for displaying video clips
of a copyrighted film in order to create a preview. 17 6 The court held for the
defendants on the amount and substantiality of the portion used because it
believed that a small "glimpse" into the copyrighted work could not repre-
167 Arriba, 336 F.3d at 821.
168 Rotbart v. J.R. O'Dwyer Co, 1995 WL 46625, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1995) (al-
lowing defendant's use of language from a plaintiffs remarks criticizing news media in
order to create a parody because he did not use any more than the amount necessary to
create his parody).
169 See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2003)
but see Maxtone-Grahm v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1986); Video Pipe-
line v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 342 F.3d 191, 201 (3rd Cir. 2003).
170 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994)
171 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1984)
(holding that defendant's publication of the President's copyrighted memoir was infringing
use even though only small portions were displayed because the published works consti-
tuted the most interesting portion of the copyrighted works).
172 Id. at 565.
171 Id. at 542.
'74 Id. at 564-65.
175 Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 342 F.3d 191, 194 (3rd Cir. 2003)
176 Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 194.
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sent the "heart" of a work.' 77 Thus Harper & Row, Video Pipeline, and
Arriba make clear that the evaluation of the amount and substantiality of
the portion used must focus on the substance of the portion copied, rather
than the amount copied. 1
7 8
4. The Effect of the Use on the Copyright Owner's Potential Market
Many courts view the effect on the potential market for the work as the
most important factor in analyzing a fair use defense. 179 This factor re-
quires an evaluation of the effects that an infringing work has on the pro-
spective market for the copyrighted work. 80 The "potential market" is con-
sidered to be those markets that the creator of the original work is likely to
develop or grant a license to others to create. 1 8' As a result, courts must
determine "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort en-
gaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market for, or value of, the plaintiffs present work."' 82 Harm
can be represented by a loss of potential licensing fees or royalties as a
result of infringing uses. 83
The effect of the market also corresponds with whether courts find the
defendant's use to be transformative. 84 According to the fair use statute, a
plaintiff need not show actual harm to the prospective market to win on
this factor. 185 Instead "a preponderance of the evidence that some meaning-
ful likelihood of future harm exists"' 86 is enough to weigh against defen-
dants on this factor. The determination of whether a work is transformative
is important because works that are not transformative and merely super-
sede the copyrighted works are able to serve as substitutes for the original
177 Id. at 201.
178 See NIMMER, supra note 104, § 13.05 [A][3], at 13-191.
179 See Hanratty, supra note 4, 26.
180 17 U.S.C. § 107 (4) (2000). The statute requires courts to evaluate "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" in its determination of
fair use. Id.
181 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
182 See NIMMER, supra note 104, § 13.05 [A][4], at 13-195.
183 On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 153, 175-76 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that de-
fendant could not establish a claim of fair use under effect on the authors market for the
copyrighted works for the use of plaintiffs clothing and accessories worn by a model in a
photographic advertisement because plaintiff could have issued a license and collected fees
for the use).
184 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (noting that as long as a copied work does not serve as
a "market replacement," it will not have a negative effect of the use on the market for the
original work).
185 Maxtone-Grahm v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding for the
defendants on the effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted work because the use
of quotations from plaintiff's book of interviews about women with unwanted pregnancies
did not affect the potential market for plaintiffs book).
186 Id. at 1263-64.
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works. 187 Because transformative works do not compete with the original
works, they are more likely to be deemed fair use based on the minimal
effect of the use on the potential market for the copyrighted works. '88 As
the Supreme Court noted in Betamax, transformative uses "need not be
prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create." 189 In Arriba,
the Ninth Circuit stated that this factor also should be used in evaluating
whether the defendant's use benefits the original works. 19° Accordingly,
the court held for the defendants because the copied works would "guide
users to Kelly's Web site rather than away from it."' 91 Therefore, accord-
ing to Arriba, uses that benefit an original copyright holder's marketability
are more likely to constitute fair use.
Not all circuits agree with the Ninth Circuit that providing a benefit to
the plaintiff is enough to ensure a finding of fair use on this factor. In BMG
Music v. Gonzalez, the Seventh Circuit held that "[c]opyright law lets au-
thors make their own decisions about how to best promote their works;
[and] copiers . . . cannot ask the courts (and juries) to second-guess the
market and call wholesale copying 'fair use' if they think that authors err
in understanding their own economic interests."' 192 The Second Circuit has
also taken a markedly different stance from the Ninth Circuit on what con-
stitutes a negative effect on a copyright owner's market.' 93 In UMG, the
Second Circuit held that by overcoming a copyright holder's right to li-
cense, the use negatively affected the potential market for the plaintiff. '
The decision demonstrated that any proof of loss in licensing revenue may
187 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (allowing defendant to establish fair use on the effect of
the use on the market for the copyrighted work because the production of a rap parody of a
copyrighted rock ballad because the rap parody could not be a "market replacement" of the
original works and therefore did not have a negative effect of the use on the market for the
original works).
188 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986). Appellants were able to estab-
lish fair use based on the effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted works for copy-
ing twenty-nine seconds of a copyrighted song to create a parody because the parody did
not fulfill the same demand as the original and therefore had no effect on the market for the
original work); see also Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Co. Inc., 458 F. Supp. 65, 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (allowing defendant's transmission of a copyrighted Italian song through a
news broadcast of a parade because the broadcast had no effect on the potential market for
the plaintiffs as the two uses did not compete with one another).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 450
(1984).
190 See, Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003).
191 Id.
192 BMG Music v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendants,
as providers of a Web site to download MP3s, could not claim fair use under this fourth
factor under the premise that providing the downloaded songs would have a positive effect
on the marketability of the copyrighted works).
193 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
194 Id.
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result in a finding against the defendant on this factor within the Second
Circuit.
Not all unauthorized use of copyrighted materials will lead to a loss of
licensing revenue, however. In Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kin-
dersley, Ltd., the District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that using copyrighted works in a transformative manner avoids the
losses of licensing revenues caused by non-transformative reproduc-
tions. '95 The court stated that an evaluation of the effect of the use will
only weigh against defendants for loss of licensing revenues when "the
market is 'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed,' and is not a
protected transformative use." 196 Because defendant's use did not supplant
the market demand for plaintiffs original work, the court held that this
factor could not weigh against the defendant. 197
E. Fair Use in Field v. Google: The Good Faith Test
Because Congress specified that copyright law was to be an "equitable
rule of reason,"' 98 the District Court of Nevada in Field looked beyond the
four factors set forth in the statute in its analysis of whether Google's us-
age qualified as fair use. Relying on the fact that § 107 directs that each of
the listed factors are to be "included" in a court's evaluation, the District
Court believed Congress did not intend that this list of factors to be consid-
ered as exhaustive.' 99 As a result, the court included an evaluation of
whether the defendant acted in good faith in their determination.
Blake Field brought suit against Google for infringing on his copyright
by displaying a cached version of his Web site through its search engine.200
Mr. Field had previously published a work entitled "Good Tea" on his per-
sonal Web site.2"' In order to catalog Web pages for its search engine,
Google uses an automated program called "Googlebot" to analyze and
195 See, Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324,
332 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
196 Id. The equitable rule of reason framework permits "courts to avoid rigid application
of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity that the law is
designed to foster." Id.
197 Id.
198 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 450
n. 31 (1984).
'99 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See also Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122
(D. Nev. 2006). The court in Field found authority to consider good faith in its fair use
evaluation based on the fact that "the Copyright Act authorizes courts to consider other
factors than the four non-exclusive factors." Id.
200 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d. at 1109.
201 Id. at 1110.
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catalog Web page content." 2 Copies of the scanned Web pages are stored
in Google's cache memory, a temporary online storage bank.2 °3 Web site
owners are able to prevent caching by placing "no archive" meta-tags
within their site.209 When Google displays Web pages, it displays another
link to the cached Web site as well, which directs users to the archival
copy.20 5 Field contended that, by allowing users to view this archival copy,
Google violated his exclusive right to distribute and reproduce his copy-
righted works.206
The court held that Google had two viable defenses to Field's claim of
copyright infringement. The first was a defense of an implied license: by
failing to insert meta-tags to prevent caching, Field made a conscious deci-
sion to allow Google to cache his site, thereby creating an implied li-
cense. 20 7 The second defense available to Google was fair use. In its fair
use analysis, the court focused not only on the four traditional factors set
out in § 107 but also a fifth factor, testing for fair use based on good
faith.208 Allowing Google's good faith actions to aid its fair use argument
strengthened Google's defense.
The District Court's analysis was supported by precedent in the Ninth
Circuit.209 In Fisher v. Dees, the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause 'fair
use' presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealings', courts may weigh 'the
propriety of the defendant's conduct' in the equitable balance of a fair use
determination., 210 Other courts also have shown a willingness to consider
whether or not the defendant acted in good faith in addition to the four
202 To provide a search engine for the World Wide Web, Google employs the "Google-
bot," an automated program that crawls the Internet and analyzes Web pages and catalogs
them into Google's searchable index. Id.
203 As part of the analyzing process, the Googlebot takes a picture of the Web site and
stores the photo in Google's cache memory. Id. When users search the Web through
Google, the search engine provides users with both the URL link to the original Web site
along with a link to the cached Web site. Id. at 1111. The cached Web site gives users a
"snapshot" of the Web site display when Google originally placed the site into their index.
Id. In the event that a URL is not working, the cached Web site will still appear. Id.
204 Id. at 1113. A meta tag is an HTML tag that contains information about a Web site.
This tag allows Internet search engines to locate the Web site. See NEWTON, supra note 28,
at 500-01.
205 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
206 Id. at 1109.
207 Id. at 1116.
208 Id. at 1122.
209 Id. (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d. 432, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1986)).
210 Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437 (quoting Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2218, 2232 (1985)).
The Court held that defendant's attempt to seek permission from plaintiff for creating a
parody version of plaintiff's song was a good faith action that weighs in his favor and there-
fore the failure of the plaintiff to give permission does not preclude a finding of fair use for
defendant's copying. Id.
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factors set out in the copyright statute.2 1' Even the Supreme Court has con-
sidered an infringer's state of mind when evaluating whether or not a de-
fendant can establish a claim for fair use.212 It must be noted that while
many courts take into account a defendant's conduct and good faith, this
factor is often integrated into a court's analysis of the purpose and charac-
ter of the defendant's use.213
Field is the first example of a court's application of the good faith test as
a distinct factor in a fair use analysis of the defendant's actions. The court
justified its addition of this factor by citing the Ninth Circuit precedent of
evaluating defendant's actions in Fisher.214 In its good faith analysis, the
District Court found that Google's actions honored industry standards and
that Google did not maliciously infringe on the plaintiffs copyright.215
Google's good faith claim centered on the act of promptly removing the
site after learning of the plaintiffs objections to the caching.216 This fifth
factor aided the court in finding for Google based on a fair use defense.217
IV. AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE: FIGHTING AGAINST A DIGITAL
LIBRARY
The Google Book Search Project is composed of two components: the
Partner Program and the Library Project. 218 The Partner Program allows
publishers who authorize Google to scan the full text of a book into the
database to share in advertising revenue with Google.219 Under this plan,
users receive a link in response to their query to a specific series of pages
of the book along with a link to purchase the book directly from the
seller. 22' After announcing the Partner Program in October of 2004,
Google followed with the Library Project in December 2004. It is this pro-
ject that has come under attack by the Authors Guild.22
211 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d
324, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that defendant's good faith actions in informing plaintiff
of the intention to use plaintiff's copyrighted photographic images and the attempt to gain a
license to use these images weighs in favor of defendant's argument for fair use).
212 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (holding that
plaintiff's denial of defendants request for license to use copyrighted works does not weigh
against finding of fair use because defendant's actions were merely a good faith effort to
avoid litigation).
213 See NIMMER, supra note 104, § 13.05 [A][1](d), at 13-179.
214 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1122-23.
217 Id at 1123.
218 Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 1 PLAGIARY 1
(2006), available at http://www.plagiary.org/Google-Library-Project.pdf.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 3.
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Through the Library Project, Google has contracted with the libraries of
Stanford University, Harvard University, Oxford University, and the Uni-
versity of Michigan, as well as the New York Public Library, to scan their
entire library collections into Google's searchable database.222 The contract
between Google and the University of Michigan shows that in scanning the
digital archives, Google will make two digital copies of each work.223
Google will give one copy back to the library and retain one copy for its
own use. 
224
Google Book Search users will be able to view full texts of public do-
main books, but only small "snippets" of text surrounding their search
terms will be available for materials covered by copyright. 225 Along with
its text display, the Web site will provide basic bibliographical information
about the book and a link to a bookstore where the work can be pur-
chased.226 The snippets consist of three or four sentences before and after
the search term. For the majority of the copied works, Google will not dis-
play more than three snippets.227 Snippets of reference books and dictionar-
ies will not be shown at all.228
Rather than provide the database on a subscription basis, Google will
fund the Library Project through the sale of advertising on its search
pages. 229 A share of these profits will be distributed to the publishers in the
Partner Program, but no revenues will be distributed to the owners of
works displayed in the Library Project.23° Currently, the Web site derives
98% of its revenues from the sale of advertising and would not be able to
provide its services freely to the public if not for the influx of advertising
revenue. 
231
In a May 2005 letter to Google, the Association of American University
Presses ("AAUP") expressed concerns that the Book Search project would
harm the licensing revenue generated by authors. 232 The AAUP also ex-
pressed its belief that the Google project would result in a violation of
copyright and that such large-scale copying and reproduction would not
222 Complaint, supra note 6, at 11.
223 Allen, supra note 54, at 105.
224 id.
225 Google Book Search, About Google Book Search,
http://books.google.comI/googlebooks/about.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
26 Google Book Search, Google Books Library Project, An Enhanced Card Catalog of
The World's Books, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2007).
227 Allen, supra note 54, at 107.
228 Band, supra note 218, at 1-2.
229 Allen, supra note 54, at 106.
230 Id.
231 Complaint, supra note 6, at 8.
232 Letter from Peter Givler, Executive Director of AAUP, to Google, Inc. (May 20,
2005), available at http://aaupnet.org/aboutup/issues/0865_001 .pdf.
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qualify as fair use.233 In response to the AAUP letter, Google temporarily
halted its digitizing program between August and November 2005. The
temporary stop was to give publishers and other copyright owners time to
"opt-out" of the Book Project; scanning resumed in November 2005.234
The AAUP did not find relief in Google's opt-out program, insisting that
the burden of acquiring permission to use copyrighted works should be on
Google.235 AAUP President Pat Schroeder criticized the opt-out program
for "shift[ing] the responsibility for preventing infringement to the copy-
right owner rather than the user, turning every principle of copyright law
on its ear.",
23 6
Similarly discontented with Google's opt-out program, the Authors
Guild and a number of individual authors whose works were copied by
Google for the Book Project brought a class action suit in September
2005.237 The complaint alleges that both Google's full copying of the
books and displaying the snippets violate the exclusive rights of copyright
holders.238 The suit seeks damages as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief.239
V. ANALYSIS
The issue facing Google is whether it can assert a viable defense against
the Authors Guild's infringement charges. Its ability to do so is much lar-
ger than the viability of the Search Project itself. The current status of
copyright law presents significant barriers in the development of digital
libraries.24 ° If the District Court for the Southern District of New York
allows Google to carry out its programs within the bounds of copyright
law, it will strengthen the jurisprudence supporting digital libraries.
In establishing a viable defense to the Authors Guild charges, Google
should assert both common law and statutory defenses. Despite the multi-
233 id.
234 See Allen, supra note 54, at 107.
235 See Band, supra note 218, at 3.
236 See id. This belief echoes the contentions of the Ninth Circuit in Napster, making
clear that the burden lies on the defendant to acquire a license to copy materials rather than
force copyright owners to bear the burden of preventing infringement. See A&M Records v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Allen, supra note 54, at
109.
237 See generally, Complaint, supra note 6.
238 Id.
239 Id. It should also be noted that on October 2005, the publishing companies of
McGraw Hill, Pearson, Penguin, Simon & Shuster, and John Wiley & Sons brought suit
against Google for copyright infringement of their works. See Band, supra note 218, at 3.
These publishers only sought injunctive relief as opposed to the declaratory relief and dam-
ages sought by the Authors Guild. Id.
240 See Travis, supra note 1, at 764-65, 788-92 (arguing that the expansion of copyrights
has created the greatest legal impediments to the creation of digital libraries).
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pie defenses available, the crux of Google's argument will rest on whether
its copying and display of information falls within the fair use exception.
Moreover, to succeed on this claim, Google must convince the court to
adopt the analytical framework set forth in Field.
A. Google's Common Law Defenses
There are two common law defenses that Google can use: the de mini-
mis copying defense and the implied license defense.
1. De Minimis Copying Defense
If Google attempts to assert a defense of de minimis copying, it would
only apply with regard to Google's display of the snippets. 24 This defense
could not apply to Google's initial digitizing of the entire books as such
portions are too great of an amount to qualify as trivial.242 Even if Google
attempts to assert a de minimis argument for the snippets, this argument is
unlikely to pass the Second Circuit's "observability" test for establishing
de minimis copying. 243 Because the portions of the copyrighted works dis-
played by Google include digital images of the works themselves, it seems
likely that the average user would recognize the appropriation, even if the
display is minimal. Such recognition would bar the finding of a de minimis
use. 244
2. An Implied License Defense
The second common law defense available to Google is an implied li-
cense defense. Google might argue that, by failing to opt-out of the pro-
gram, the members of the Authors Guild granted an implied license for use
of their works. 245 This claim raises a debate about whether an implied li-
241 See Allen, supra note 54, at 106.
242 See Hanratty, supra note 4, 7. According to Hanratty, Google is not likely to suc-
ceed in a claim of de minimis copying because "the sheer volume of copied works reasons
against a de minimis finding." Id.
243 See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998). To
ascertain whether or not the defendant's use qualifies de minimis, courts must decide
whether the copied work is likely to be recognized by an average audience. Id. See also
supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
244 See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217-18.
245 See Band, supra note 218, at 3.
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cense exists when a plaintiff fails to opt out of a defendant's creation that
intends to use copyrighted works without gaining express permission.246
Unfortunately for Google, courts have accepted only very limited appli-
cations of the implied license defense. 247 For example, the Ninth Circuit in
Napster held that an implied license defense is only applicable in situations
where the original creator of the work handed his or her work over to the
user at the user's request. 248 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York echoed this narrow view in Pavlica v. Behr. In order to assert a
claim of an implied license, the court required that the defendant show
"that there was a meeting of the minds as defined by contract law." 249 This
precedent on implied licenses highlights the unwillingness of courts to
view reliance on an opt-out scheme favorably.250
Google may argue that contacting each individual copyright owner
would be infeasible and too burdensome to allow for the creation of the
Book Search Project. Without a recording system to keep track of each
author, Google believes that many authors would be too difficult to track
down.25' An opt-in regime would also lessen the amount of information
available to users of the Google Book Search Project, providing few incen-
tives for authors to make their work available.252 Therefore, for Google to
succeed on an implied license claim, the court would need to expand the
application of implied license defense to include opt-out schemes.
On its face, Field raises hopes that opt-out schemes may be no longer be
viewed disfavorably.253 In Field, the court held that because the defendant
246 See Bracha, supra note 1, at 4-5, 9. See also Impact, supra note 32 ("This emphasis
on opt out seems critical [to Google's case] since Google has argued that book publishers
can simply tell them if they don't want their books digitized.").
247 See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (allow-
ing the establishment of an implied license only in the case where the plaintiff handed the
works over to the defendant with the intention that it be used by the plaintiff); Pavlica v.
Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The District Court prevented an em-
ployer from asserting an implied license to redistribute a manual produced by an employee
outside the scope of his employment because the employer could not establish a "meeting
of the minds" between employer and employee, nor was any consideration given to the
employee to allow for the distribution of his works. Id.
248 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1026 (citing SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v.
Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 (2nd Cir. 2000)). The Court held that an implied
license can only exist "where one party 'created a work at [the other's] request and handed
it over." Id
249 Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
250 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1026; see also Allen, supra note 54, at 109.
251 Travis, supra note 1, at 805-06.
252 See Bracha, supra note 1, at 55-58 (discussing the public policy arguments for allow-
ing Google and other digital libraries to use an opt-out scheme to gain information).
253 See Impact, supra note 32 ("Field v. Google... has obvious and important implica-
tions for the legality of Google's library digitization project."); Gov't Tech., Nevada Court
Rules Google Cache is Fair Use (2006), http://www.govtech.net/news/news.php?id=98086
(noting the favorable implications the ruling in Field may have on the Authors Guild case).
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was aware of Google's copying practices and failed to prevent the search
engine's caching, he had granted an implied license.2 54 However, closer
analysis reveals that Google's actions in Field fell within the narrow appli-
cation of what constitutes an implied license.2 55 Like Napster's require-
ments that a plaintiff hand over his work with the intention that it be used
by the defendant, Field was responsible for placing his works in Google's
search engine with the knowledge that caching would occur unless he took
actions to prevent it. 256 Unlike the defendants in Field and Napster, how-
ever, the members of the Authors Guild did not hand their works over to
Google to be digitized. Therefore, despite the favorable view that Field
takes towards opt-out programs, it is not enough to aid Google's estab-
lishment of an implied license defense.
B. Google's Statutory Defenses
Because neither of the common law doctrines of de minimis copying or
an implied license are a viable defense to its usage, Google must instead
turn to statutory authority to exempt its infringement from liability. The
two statutory limitations to copyright liability that may apply to Google's
case are the library and the fair use exemptions. 57
Google may attempt to assert the statutory library exemption defense for
the initial digitization of the library materials. This claim would rest on the
fact that libraries should be able to contract for services that they are al-
lowed to perform for themselves. 5 8 Yet, based on the stringent require-
254 Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006). In Field, the court
found that Google could claim an implied license for its display of the cached Web site
because the defendant's failure to 'opt-out' of the caching program could be equated to a
"conscious decision to permit it," thereby resulting in the granting of an implied license. Id.
255 Id. In Field the defendant handed his works over to the search engine with knowledge
that his Web site would be used by Google. Id. In contrast, the authors bringing suit against
Google for the Book Search Project were unaware that their work would be used by Google
as a result of publication. See Complaint, supra note 6.
... See Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (establishing that Google's implied license defense
arose from the fact that Field handed his works over to Google to be placed in the search
engine's holdings and his awareness of Google's intentions to cache and display a cached
version of his Web site); see also A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that an implied license only exists in the narrow circumstances where
the plaintiff handed the works over to the defendant with knowledge that the defendant
intended to use it) (citing SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson
Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 (2d. Cir. 2000)).
257 See Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-108 (2000) (setting
forth statutory limitations to the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders).
258 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2000) (allowing libraries to produce no more than one copy
of a work within their collection); See also Hanratty, supra note 4, 8. Because the library
exemption in the copyright statute allows libraries to make copies of their own works for
archival purposes, Google may argue that libraries should be allowed to contract these
services to others. Id.
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ments set forth in the statute and the legislative history, it is clear that Con-
gress did not mean for any "for profit" institution or digital library to fall
within the library exemption.259 Because Google's Book Search Project
falls within both of these limitations, it cannot assert the library exemption
for its benefit.26 Therefore, the crux of Google's case will be Google's
ability to establish a fair use defense.
C. Fair Use Under the Traditional Four Factor Test
Without common law authority or the library exemption on its side,
Google's fate rests on its ability to assert a fair use exemption to its in-
fringement.16 1 In evaluating a claim of fair use, the Campbell doctrine in-
structs that the four factors set forth in the fair use statute "are to be ex-
plored, and the results weighed together. .262 Thus, in order to succeed
on its fair use claim, Google must demonstrate that the overall balance of
the four factors set forth in the statute weigh in its favor. Moreover, Google
must convince the District Court for the Southern District of New York to
adopt the Field framework and use a five factor test, analyzing good faith
as part of the claim to fair use. Under this application, Google should suc-
ceed in establishing fair use and open the door for the creation of more
digital libraries in the future.263
1. Where Google's Fair Use Claims Are Likely to Succeed
The last two factors in the fair use statute call for courts to evaluate the
amount and substantiality of the portion used and the effect the use will
have on the market for the copyright works. Under the framework set forth
in Betamax, Arriba, and their progeny, it is likely that Google can convince
the court that these factors weigh in its favor.
259 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2000). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 74 (1976) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5679; S. REP. No. 105-190 at 62 (1998)
Although online interactive digital networks have since given birth to online digital
'libraries' and 'archives' that exist only in the virtual (rather than physical) sense on
websites, bulletin boards and homepages across the Internet, it is not the Committee's
intent that section 108 as revised apply to such collections of information.
Id.
260 See Hanratty, supra note 4, 11.
261 Id., 14-32 (asserting that Google is unlikely to succeed against the charges of the
Authors Guild because it will not be able to establish a fair use defense). But see, Band,
supra note 218; Impact supra note 32.
262 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
263 See Impact, supra note 32 (noting that Google is likely to succeed against the Authors
Guild's charges in light of the Field decision).
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a. Google Can Establish Fair Use Based on the Amount and Substantial-
ity of the Portion Used
Google must show that the amount and substantiality of the portion used
does not violate fair use.264 In order to establish a viable argument, Google
must show that both the initial digitizing and the display of the snippets
qualify as fair use. 26 While Google must make out both elements of the
case, much of the finding will depend on whether Google's display of the
snippets is fair use. As Arriba, Accolade, and Atari Games Corp. v. Nin-
tendo have shown, wholesale intermediate copying may be excusable if it
is necessary for the creation of the defendant's final product. 66 Based on
the reasoning set forth in Accolade and Arriba, Google can argue that its
initial digitizing of the entire books is necessary in order to create a com-
plete database for customers to search. 267
In order for such an argument to succeed, Google also must prove that its
end use of the works, the display of the "snippets," qualifies as fair use.
Google's argument may focus on the small amount of the works displayed
to bolster its claim.268 Though the minimal use weighs in Google's fa-
vor,269 courts have found against a defendant's claim to fair use when even
a small portion of a copyrighted works is used.270 Therefore, to establish a
264 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute requires courts to evaluate "the amount and substantial-
ity of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole" as a factor in its
determination of fair use. Id.
265 Caroline Horton Rockafellow, Is Google Redefining Digital Copyright Law? IP
FRONTLINECOM, Mar. 24, 2006,
http://ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=10068&&deptid4 (implying that Google must
establish fair use based on the right to copy the initial works and the right to display each of
these works in order to succeed against charges of copyright infringement).
266 Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2003). In Kelly, the court
allowed the defendant to establish fair use based on the amount and substantiality of the
portion used despite wholesale copying of the plaintiff's works. The court found the defen-
dant's copying was allowable because "[i]t was necessary for Arriba to copy the entire
image to allow users to recognize the image and decide whether to pursue more information
about the image or the originating web site." Id. See also, Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that reverse engineering by wholesale copy-
ing of a plaintiffs works in order to create its own works qualifies as fair use by the defen-
dant because it is the only possible means to accomplish the creation of a competitive prod-
uct); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
267 Band, supra note 218, at 7.
268 See Allen, supra note 53, at 108 ("Statements by Google and its supporters tend to
focus on the small amounts of digitised [sic] works that will be made available to someone
searching the database.").
269 See Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 342 F.3d 191, 201 (3rd Cir. 2003)
(stating that defendant's display of video clips to create a preview of a copyrighted movie
was fair use because the clips only gave a small "glimpse" into the copyrighted works and
could not copy the "heart" of the works).
270 See, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1984)
(holding that defendants could not establish a claim of fair use based on the amount and
substantiality of the portion used for copying small portions of the President's unpublished
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viable claim under this factor, Google must establish that its copying is fair
use because both the amount and the substance used are insubstantial.
Google is likely to succeed on the claim that the amount copied qualifies
as fair use as "snippets" are unlikely to tell the entire story of the copied
books due to the small portions that will be displayed. Analogizing the
movie clips of Video Pipeline to the snippets displayed via the Google
Book Search Project, it is unlikely that these snippets could display the
"heart" of an author's work.27' Therefore, together with the holding in Ar-
riba, Video Pipeline can help Google establish that fair use weighs in its
favor based on the amount and substantiality of the portion used.
b. Google Can Establish Fair Use Based on the Effect of the Use on the
Author's Market for the Copyrighted Works
The effects on marketability factor require the court evaluate whether or
not Google's use will cause harm to the original copyright owner's right to
profit.2 72 Courts are not required to evaluate whether actual harm has oc-
curred, but rather whether the use has an effect on the potential market of
the copyright holder. 73 In UMG, the Second Circuit held that the loss in
potential licensing revenue from any conceivable market creates a pre-
sumption of harm under this factor.2 74 The Authors Guild claims that this
presumption should weigh against Google because the authors have lost
the ability to gain from licensing revenues.275 The existence of the Google
Partner Program supports this claim, showing that there is revenue to be
gained.276 If UMG were applied, Google could not establish fair use under
this factor because its use would be barring copyright owners from exercis-
ing their right to license the use of their books to the Google Book Search
program.277
memoirs because the portions copied were the most interesting parts of the copied works).
See also, Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 201; Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349
F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2003).
271 Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 201 (establishing that defendant's use of clips of a copy-
righted movie in order to create a preview constituted fair use based on the amount and
substantiality of the portion used because the clips could not represent the "heart" of the
work).
272 17 U.S.C. § 107 (4) (2000). The statute requires courts to evaluate "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" in its fair use determi-
nation. Id.
273 Id.
274 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that the broad rights of copyright holders includes the right to refuse or to grant a
license to enter a derivative market).
275 See Band, supra note 218, at 9.
276 Id.
277 See Hanratty, supra note 4, 30.
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Yet many courts have refrained from using such a strict evaluation of the
effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted works.27 The Ninth
Circuit moved away from the strict application of this factor in Arriba and
"properly focused on the lack of actual harm to the market."279 Its finding
rested on the belief that "[a] transformative work is less likely to have an
adverse impact on the market of the original than a work that merely su-
persedes the copyrighted work."2 ° Although the District Court for the
Southern District of New York is not bound by the decision in Arriba, the
court has previously cited Arriba in holding that transformative uses are
likely to succeed under an evaluation of the effect of the use because they
will not supplant the demand for the original product.2"' Therefore, Google
must persuade the court to adopt the favorable interpretations set forth in
Arriba and Betamax to reach the conclusion that, through the Google Book
Search project, original copyrighted works are transformed by being made
searchable through the Web site.
To establish this, Google must convince the court to adopt the doctrines
espoused in Betamax and Arriba for what qualifies as a transformative use.
Betamax supports the contention that the court should construe copyright
law in favor of technology that benefits the public, 282 while Arriba gives
an example of how to apply copyright law to a case factually similar to the
Authors Guild case. 283 The interpretations set forth in these the two cases
help establish that Google's use is transformative in nature.
In Betamax, the Supreme Court created flexibility in a court's ability to
decide what is transformative. Believing that the capabilities of technology
should not be stifled in the face of copyright law,28 4 the majority directed
courts to construe copyright law "in light of its basic purpose" 285 when the
application of the law is unclear. The holding demonstrated the Court's
278 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
negative repercussions of too strict an application of fair use could result in overly restrict-
ing the application of fair use); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117-19 (D.
Nev. 2006); see also Travis, supra note 1, at 818 (arguing that it is too easy for plaintiffs to
establish potential harm, causing a reduction in the protections of fair use).
279 Arriba, 336 F.3d at 821-22.
280 Id. at 821.
281 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d
324, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a defendant may establish fair use for the effect of
the use on the author's market for the copyrighted work in instances where the copied work
does not supplant the market for the original).
282 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 432
(1984); see also Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1875 (arguing that the framework set forth in
Betamax allows courts to flexibly apply copyright law to allow for the development of new
technology).
283 See Band, supra note 218, at 3-5.
284 See Betamax, 464 U.S. at 432 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975)) ("When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambigu-
ous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.").
285 Id.
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support for technological innovations that benefit the public interest above
the rights of copyright holders.286 Betamax is often cited as the basis for
adapting copyright law to allow for the development of technologies rang-
ing from tape recorders, photocopiers, and MP3 players to software.2"7 The
progress of such technologies resulted either from common law exceptions
created by the court, such as reverse engineering,2"' or statutory exceptions
to Internet service providers' liability as provided in DMCA.2 s9 Each adap-
tation of the law was based on the belief that these new uses benefited the
public.290
Though the Arriba holding does not cite to Betamax, the Ninth Circuit
used a similar framework to the one set forth by the Supreme Court in or-
der to construe copyright law to accommodate new technological devel-
opments that benefit the public.29' Just as the defendant in Arriba suc-
ceeded on the public benefit argument, Google must argue that, under the
Betamax framework, its new project should be deemed transformative be-
cause of the public benefits it will provide.
In response to Google's arguments, the Authors Guild may assert that
UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, not Arriba, should apply as it provides
mandatory authority from the Second Circuit.2 92 As stated in UMG, the
mere "repackaging" of works over a different medium is not to be consid-
ered a transformative use.293 If the Authors Guild were to succeed on this
argument, Google's use would be deemed unfair on both the purpose and
character of the use and the effect of the use. The transformative nature of
a work determines not only whether it can be fair under the purpose and
character of the use, but also under the effect of the use on the market for
286 See Proskine, supra note 73, at 232.
287 See Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1875.
288 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992). The court
held that reverse engineering was allowable because it upholds the ultimate purpose of the
Copyright Act as described in Betamax. The disassembly of computer programs by other
users is "the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a
copyrighted computer program." Id. See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1868-70.
289 See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860,
2877-79 (1998) (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 512) (limiting copyright infringement liability for
Internet service providers under specific circumstances).
290 See Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1874-1875.
291 See id. at 1875. Samuelson argues that though Betamax was not directly cited in
Arriba, the framework was applied, as "Justice Steven's analytic framework in Betamax, it
seems, sometimes has an influence, even when not directly cited." Id.
292 See Band, supra note 218, at 6.
293 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The
court held that, by allowing users of its service to copy previously recorded music programs
onto its servers, defendants were merely repackaging works to facilitate transmission
through a different medium and therefore did not qualify as transformative use. Id.
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the copyrighted works.294 Yet Google can easily distinguish this precedent
because its usage adds a feature that is unavailable to the users of the origi-
nal works by allowing the books to become searchable rather than merely
redistributing the books through a different medium.295
Though Arriba does not represent mandatory authority for the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, it is more analogous in this
case than UMG because of its factual similarity.296 Google's snippets are
not a reproduction of the books but rather create a guide for search engine
users to find the information they desire. More importantly, the Book
Search project will allow users far greater access to books than the average
library or bookstore.297 The Google Book Search project will allow users
increased and more effective access to information, and is therefore trans-
formative in its use under the framework set forth in both Betamax and
Arriba. Therefore, Google must argue that, just as the thumbnails in Arriba
did not supplant the market demand for true photographs, Google's use of
the "snippets" will not supplant the market for real books. As a transforma-
tive use, Google would be able to establish fair use based on the effect of
the use on the market for the copyrighted works.
2. Where Google's Arguments for Fair Use Will Not Succeed
Though Arriba and Betamax can help Google establish fair use based on
the amount and substantiality of the portion used and the potential effect of
the use on the author's market for the copyrighted works, their favorable
interpretations of the statute cannot help Google based on the purpose and
character of the use and the nature of the copyrighted works. Conse-
quently, based on the purpose and character of its use and the nature of the
copyrighted works, the Authors Guild is likely to succeed in its claim of
copyright infringement.
a. Why Google's Usage is Not Fair Use Based on the Purpose and Char-
acter of the Use
A commercial entity may be able to establish fair use under the purpose
and character of the use if it can prove that its works are transformative in
294 A non-transformative use should fail under an evaluation of the effect of the use on
the market for the copyrighted works because it provides a market supplement for the origi-
nal copyrighted works. This is because a non-transformative use is likely to harm the origi-
nal author's potential to derive exclusive benefits from his or her use. See Proskine, supra
note 73, at 229. Courts are less likely to find fair use under the effect on the marketplace
when the copied work is a substitute for the original because "a secondary user that inter-
feres excessively with an author's incentive subverts the aim of copyright." Id.
295 See Band, supra note 218, at 6.
296 See id. at 3-5.
297 See Travis, supra note 1, at 801.
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nature.29 Because Google has a viable argument for establishing a trans-
formative use, it can argue that, as in Arriba, the transformative nature of
its use should outweigh its commercial nature and allow a successful claim
of fair use under this factor.
Despite this argument, the recent case Perfect 10 v. Google shows that a
finding of a transformative use is not always enough to overcome the
commercial character of a defendant.299 Though the Google Book Search
Project does not display banner advertisements directly onto its query re-
sults page as Google had in Perfect 10, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York has established a broad view on what uses are com-
mercial, declaring even indirect benefits gained by the defendant as com-
mercial uses.3 ° ° In light of Perfect 10, the transformative nature of
Google's use is unlikely to outweigh the commercial character of its use.
As a result, the purpose and character of the use will likely weigh against
Google.
b. Why Google's Usage is Not Fair Use Based on the Nature of the
Copyrighted Works
In Campbell, the Supreme Court held that evaluating the nature of the
copyrighted works is not helpful in a fair use evaluation when dealing with
transformative uses.3 ' Despite this holding, lower courts have been unwill-
ing to disregard this factor in their analysis of copyright claims involving
transformative uses.30 2 As the Ninth Circuit noted in Arriba, it is difficult
for defendants to establish fair use on this factor when the works copied
298 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (allowing
defendants to succeed in a claim of fair use under this factor despite the commercial nature
of its use because the copied works were transformed by the defendant into a new idea).
299 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847-50 (C.D.C.A. 2006) (holding
that Arriba could not help Google establish fair use based on the purpose and characters use
for its search engine's display of thumbnails of copyrighted photographs from the Internet
because Google derived a greater commercial benefit from its use than the defendant in
Arriba, making its use consumptive and commercial rather than transformative).
300 See Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. 503 F. Supp. 1137,
1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2nd Cir. 1982) (disallowing defendant, CBS
from establishing fair use for the display of a copyrighted compilation in an unsponsored
broadcast because of the potential commercial benefit CBS could gain as a result of the
broadcast).
301 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (stating that an evaluation of the nature of the copyrighted
works is "not much help" in evaluating transformative uses); see also Field v. Google, Inc.,
412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120 (D. Nev. 2006). With regard to transformative uses, this factor
has been described as "not ... terribly significant in the overall fair use balancing." Id.
(citing Mattel Inc. v. Walker Mountains Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003)).
302 See Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1120; Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820
(9th Cir. 2003), Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d
324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Each case used evaluation of the nature of the copyrighted work
in the fair use analysis despite a finding of a transformative use.
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are creative, rather than factual, in nature.3"3 Because the Project will pri-
marily display snippets of books that are creative in nature, 3" it is unlikely
Google could establish a claim of fair use based on this second factor.3"5
D. Fair Use Under the Field Framework
Under the framework set forth in Field, a determination of fair use re-
quires an evaluation of the four factors set forth in the statute along with an
assessment of whether or not the defendant acted in good faith, directing
each of these factors to be weighed equally.30 6 Under the four statutory
factors alone, it is unlikely that Google could succeed in establishing fair
use. Though Google should establish fair use based on the amount and
substantiality of the portion used factor and the effect of the use on the
market for the copyrighted works factor, the court is unlikely to find for
Google on the purpose and character of use and the nature of usage factors.
Therefore, Google must convince the court to weigh good faith in its
analysis in order to tip the balance of fair use in its favor. 307
Google must demonstrate that its conduct throughout the Book Search
Project production reflected a good faith attempt to avoid infringement.
Though the opt-out policy does not create an implied license for Google, it
does reflect well on the search engine's conduct by showing it did not in-
tend to reproduce the works of authors who opposed the copying of their
works. 308 Also, by ceasing the digitization to allow a period for authors to
opt out, Google's actions were similar to the actions taken in Field where
Google removed the cached Web site upon learning of Mr. Field's objec-
tion to the display of his works. 3°9 Based on the similarity of factual cir-
cumstances, it is likely that Google could establish its good faith if the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York were to adopt this factor
into its analysis.310
303 Arriba, 336 F.3d. at 820 (holding that defendant could not establish a viable claim of
fair use based on the nature of the copyrighted works for reproducing of photographs,
which are creative in nature, because the core purpose of copyright law is to protect such
works).
304 The Project will not display snippets of encyclopedias or dictionaries. See supra Part
IV.
305 See Hanratty, supra note 4, 22; Proskine, supra note 73, at 226.
306 Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117-23 (D. Nev. 2006).
307 See Impact, supra note 32.
308 See Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23 (declaring a new standard by which to judge a
defendant's conduct in order to evaluate whether or not the use qualifies as good faith).
309 id.
310 See Impact, supra note 32.
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E. Will the Southern District of New York Adopt the Field Five Factor
Test?
Because the Nevada District Court's decision is not binding outside of its
district, the important issue becomes whether the Southern District of New
York is likely to adopt the five factor analysis in Field. While no case
within the district court or the Second Circuit has taken the approach of
using good faith as a factor in analyzing fair use, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York has shown a willingness to look outside the
four factors described in § 10 7. 31 The recent copyright infringement cases
Kane v. Comedy Partners312 and Dorling Kindersley v. Bill Graham Ar-
chives indicate that the inclusion of good faith in a fair use analysis is not
unheard of in the Southern District of New York's court. Furthermore,
public policy arguments for the creation of digital libraries and their bene-
fits may entice the district court to adopt a new application of copyright
law.313 Together, the case law and public policy arguments make it likely
that the District Court for the Southern District of New York will adopt the
Field framework, thus creating an application of fair use that will allow the
Google Book Search Project to withstand claims of infringement.
1. Case Law Arguments for the Adoption of Field's Framework
Despite the fact that Kane differs factually from both Field and the cur-
rent case, the analysis used by the Kane court closely resembles that set
forth in Field. Citing persuasive authority in Fisher, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York included an evaluation of the defen-
dant's good faith in its analysis of fair use.314 In Kane, an unauthorized clip
of plaintiffs television show was aired on defendant's nationally televised
comedy show.315 Even though it found the defendant's use was in fact un-
authorized, the court found that the use was not enough to show bad
faith.3 16 In fact, the court held that defendant's attempt to seek plaintiffs
permission and inform plaintiff of the pending use qualified as good
faith.3 7 Therefore, Kane indicates that the District Court for the Southern
311 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d
324, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Kane v. Comedy Partners, 2003 WL 22383387 at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003).
312 Kane, 2003 WL 22383387, at *7 (holding that defendant's use of a clip from plain-
tiff's public access television show in defendant's comedy show was fair use based on the
four factors set forth in § 107 and the defendants showing of good faith in the use).
313 See generally, Travis, supra note 1 (discussing the benefits to be gained from digital
libraries and how the current status of copyright law provides an impediment their creation).
314 Kane, 2003 WL 22383387, at *7.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 id.
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District of New York is willing to consider a defendant's conduct and
whether his actions were in good faith separately from the factors set out in
the federal copyright statute.
In Dorling, the District Court again displayed a willingness to consider
good faith as a distinct factor to apply in evaluating a fair use defense. The
court again cited the Ninth Circuit holding in Fisher as the basis for weigh-
ing the defendant's conduct as an additional factor determining fair use,
asserting that fair use allows courts to "consider whether the defendant
exercised good faith," in evaluating copyright infringement charges.3
18
Dorling reduced images of plaintiffs copyrighted concert posters and re-
produced them in their entirety in defendant's book. 319 As it had in Kane,
the court found that by informing the plaintiff of his intention to use the
copyrighted works and attempting to secure plaintiffs permission, Dor-
ling's conduct supported a finding of good faith. 320 As a result, the court
held that defendant's good faith conduct weighed favorably "in the equita-
ble balance of fair use."32'
2. Public Policy Arguments for Adopting the Field Framework
For Google to advance a compelling argument to entice the District
Court for the Southern District of New York to adopt the Field five factor
analysis, it must convince the court of the Google Book Search Project's
public importance and its impact beyond Google itself. In Betamax, the
Supreme Court indicated that increasing access to knowledge serves the
public interest. 322 The Court cited the constitutional foundation of copy-
right law, 323 empowering Congress to promote the public interest through
the progress of science and arts.324 To persuade the District Court to adopt
the additional fair use factor, Google must demonstrate that the Book Pro-
ject promotes the public interest.
Google has a strong case that the Book Search Project provides a public
benefit. 325 By allowing the ideas of millions of authors to become search-
able online, the project will allow the public to access vast amounts of in-
318 Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
"' Id. at 325.
320 Id. at 333.
321 Id.
322 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 432
(1984); see also Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1849-50.
323 Betamax, 464 U.S. at 428-29.
324 See Proskine, supra note 73, at 237.
325 See id at 232.; see also Band, supra note 218, at 7 (arguing that Google has a good
case for fair use based on the public benefit offered in allowing extensive works to become
easily searchable).
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formation.3 26 Along with leading to a greater public dissemination of
knowledge, the Google project's initial digitizing also serves the public
interest by assuring the safe-keeping of creative works for use by future
generations.327 Opponents of the Google Book Search project fear that the
service will replace other online libraries and allow Google to create a mo-
nopoly for information.3 28 Google contends that the service will instead aid
libraries by guiding users to either purchase the books or borrow from li-
braries as a result of their queries.329 In addition, a victory for the Google
Book Search Project will pave the way for other libraries of its kind to con-
tinue increasing the amount of information available online.33°
Though neither the Second Circuit nor the District Court for the Southern
District of New York have defined what constitutes a public benefit, the
policy rationale underpinning copyright law supports a finding that
Google's Book Search Project promotes this interest. Moreover, the con-
gressional attempt to develop an online library through the Library of Con-
gress' American Memory Project is a direct endorsement of the use of new
technology to increase public access to information.33' In Betamax, the
Supreme Court held that where the application of copyright law is unclear
in the face of technology, courts must construe the law in light of its basic
purpose.33 2 Thus, the Court construed copyright law to create a new mean-
ing for what qualifies as a transformative use in order to deem the defen-
dant's use fair and therefore promote the public interest. The analytical
framework set forth in Field provides the Authors Guild court a means to
achieve similar results, one the court is likely to implement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because copyright law is an "equitable rule of reason," there are no
brightline tests for fair use; the law instead requires judgment of each case
on the facts.333 As the Supreme Court has noted, the equitable rule of rea-
son rationale provides courts flexibility in applying copyright analyses in
326 See Proskine, supra note 73, at 232.
327 See Travis, supra note 1, at 762-63 (arguing the fragile nature of physical libraries
warrants a need to digitize the works for safekeeping).
328 Sarah Waladan, Open Democracy, Google Search or Destroy, Google Has Indicated
its Willingness to be Seen as a Corporate Citizen, http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-
copyrightlaw/google 3130.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
329 See Band, supra note 218, at 7 (claiming that by making books searchable online,
demand for such books will increase rather than decrease as a result, creating greater incen-
tives to use the resources of libraries).
330 See Travis, supra note 1, at 774-76.
331 Library of Congress-American Memory Project, About American Memory, Mission
and History, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
332 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
333 See id. at 448 n.30; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5679.
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order to achieve a desired outcome.3 34 Under the traditional four factor
analysis of fair use, Google's Book Search project is unlikely to succeed.
Yet because of the public benefit likely to be derived from such a project
along with future projects of its kind, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York must find a way to construe copyright law to ac-
commodate for this technology, just as the Supreme Court did in Be-
tamax. 335
The application of fair use in the Authors Guild case has implications
beyond the success of the Google Book Search project. 336 Without direc-
tion from the legislature as to the proper application of copyright law to
these circumstances, the fate of Google's Book Search Project rests on how
the District Court applies the law and the fair use exemption. 37 The case
gives the court an opportunity to expand the reaches of fair use and estab-
lish greater protections for digital libraries, thus encouraging their crea-
tion. 3 8 To achieve this expansion, the court must find a way to construe
the application of the law so that all may reap its benefits. Therefore, the
District Court should include an evaluation of good faith in order to shift
the balance of fair use factors in Google's favor and allow the Book Search
project to succeed, as the cases of Dorling and Kane indicate that the court
is willing to do. By applying the Field framework, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York would gain the ability to promote the
growth of technology without requiring changes to copyright law.
334 See, e.g., Betamax, 464 U.S. 417; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990). The
equitable rule of reason framework "permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copy-
right statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
to foster." Id. (quoting Iowa State Univ. Res. Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57,
60 (2nd Cir. 1980)). See also Samuelson, supra note 62, at 1850-75 (discussing how the
general framework set forth in Betamax has allowed courts to change the application of
copyright law to allow for the development of new technologies).
5 See Waladan, supra note 328.
336 See Impact, supra note 32.
337 See id.
338 See Travis, supra note 1, at 833. "The implementation of these reforms will offer the
builders of digital libraries a degree of certainty that existing law does not provide, and thus
ensure that digital libraries will be as abundant and widely accessible as possible." Id.
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